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I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile services have evolved dramatically in the industry's short
technological lifetime, moving from high-priced, brick-sized devices offering
basic phone service to reasonably priced, miniature computers with the ability
to make phone calls and provide broadband Internet access. Apple's iPhone
embraced the revolution of the mobile industry when it was introduced in
2007. In the past four years, mobile data-traffic and consumer subscribership
have increased considerably in the United States.' While these trends likely
will continue,2 an impending shortage of commercial radio spectrum could
limit the extent of this growth.
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1 See generally Adam Bryant, iSee Into the Future, Therefore iAm, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2007, http://commcns.org/ty609c. In re of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive
Market Conditions with Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile
Services, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, 1 4 (May 20, 2010) [hereinafter 14th
Wireless Report].
2 See Rob Pegoraro, The Wide Wireless Word at CES, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2011),
http://commcns.org/uPE9uv; FCC, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL
SPECTRUM 4-5 (2010) [hereinafter COMMISSION SPECTRUM REPORT]. See also Cisco, Cisco
VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST UPDATE, 2010-
2015, at 5 (2011) [hereinafter Cisco MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC REPORT].
3 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Prepared Remarks, America's Mobile Broadband
Future, INTERNATIONAL CTIA WIRELESS I.T. & ENTERTAINMENT (Oct. 7, 2009), available at
http://commcns.org/vDMNEQ (explaining "the biggest threat to the future of mobile in
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The National Broadband Plan reevaluated the U.S. spectrum policy in part
because the unprecedented growth in the commercial mobile broadband
industry has created unsustainable demands on spectrum upon which next-
generation wireless services rely.4 Federal Communications Commission
("Commission" or "FCC") staff6 released the National Broadband Plan in
March 2010, which called for the FCC to make 500 megahertz ("MHz") of
spectrum "newly available for mobile broadband use [by 2020]" and advised
that 300 MHz of that 500 MHz should be repurposed by 2015 to address the
spectrum crunch. 6 Additionally, it suggested that Congress should authorize
the FCC to conduct voluntary incentive auctions because doing so would
enable the Commission to unleash a meaningful amount of spectrum for
mobile broadband in a quick enough time period.7
The Commission has released notices of inquiry and proposed rulemaking
seeking public comment on these recommendations to make additional
spectrum available for mobile broadband use. In addition, members of the
112th Congress have addressed this National Broadband Plan objective by
introducing several bills that would grant the FCC voluntary incentive auction
authority. 9 The National Broadband Plan's proposed voluntary incentive
auction scheme calls for the FCC to implement rules allowing incumbent
broadcast television licensees to voluntarily relinquish 120 MHz of spectrum
for competitive bidding by next-generation users.10 Proceeds from these
voluntary incentive auctions would be split amongst the U.S. Treasury and
incumbent licensee participants.ii Regardless of the percentage of money that
incumbent licensees collect, voluntary incentive auctions would make
additional spectrum available for mobile wireless while protecting incumbent
America is the looming spectrum crisis").
4 See Jim Carney et al., Overview of the National Broadband Plan, 18 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUs 517, 529 (2010) [hereinafter National Broadband Plan Overview]. See also
Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery, CTIA WIRELESS
2011 (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/tC5mcm.
5 Congress directed the FCC staff to release a report on broadband. This staff report
should be distinguished from official rulemaking or adjudication that is subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001(5). See also FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, at viv (2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN].
6 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 84.
Id. at 81-83.
8 FCC, National Broadband Plan: Year I Progress Report, BROADBAND.GOV,
htt ://commens.org/vb60UR (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
Spectrum Optimization Act, S. 415, 112th Cong. (2011); Public Safety Spectrum and
Wireless Innovation Act, S. 28, 112th Cong. (2011); Reforming Airwaves by Developing
Incentives and Opportunistic Sharing (RADIOS) Act, S. 455, 112th Cong. (2011); Spectrum
Inventory and Auction Act of 2011, H.R. 911, 112th Cong. (2011).
10 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 88.
" Id. at 81-82.
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licensees' interests and reducing the nation's public debt.12
This Note contends that Congress should equip the FCC with authority to
implement voluntary incentive auctions as a means to repurpose commercial
spectrum for mobile wireless use. First, it examines the current statutory
structure governing commercial spectrum, trends in mobile wireless
technology, and the importance of unleashing spectrum for mobile broadband.
Next, it discusses the interests of different stakeholders-facilities-based
wireless, broadcast television, and mobile satellite services ("MSS")
licensees-and explores the commercial spectrum reform actions of both the
FCC and Congress. Part IV proposes that Congress authorize the FCC to
conduct voluntary incentive auctions because doing so would help avert the
mobile spectrum crisis while reducing national debt and protecting incumbent
licensees. Finally, this Note concludes that the market-based policy inherent to
voluntary incentive auctions would result in the most efficient and highest
valued use of commercial spectrum.
II. BACKGROUND
This section outlines the FCC's current authority to assign and repurpose
spectrum licenses for commercial use. Additionally, it discusses the
accelerated adoption rate of commercial mobile broadband services and how
increased data traffic has impacted commercial spectrum holders, who have
fostered innovative practices, economic growth, and job creation during the
industry's short life span. Finally, this section examines why repurposing
additional spectrum for mobile broadband is vital to meeting consumer
demand and promoting spectral efficiency.
A. The Current Statutory Structure Governing Commercial Spectrum Use
The FCC issues licenses for commercial use of radio spectrum to applicants
who further the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."' 3 Broadcast
television stations and mobile service providers are among these FCC
licensees. 14 Section 309(j) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the
FCC to grant spectrum licenses to one of the competing applicants through a
12 Id. at 82. See also CTIA THE WIRELESS Ass'N & CONSUMER ELEC. Ass'N, BROADCAST
SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTIONS 2 (2011) [hereinafter BROADCAST SPECTRUM INCENTIVE
AUCTIONS] (demonstrating that the auction of 120 MHz of underutilized broadcast television
spectrum will produce more than $33 billion in net proceeds for the U.S. Treasury).
13 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2006).
4 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (2006). Noncommercial, federal government use of spectrum is
managed by the National Telecommunications and Information Association ("NTIA"). See
also id. § 305.
1652011]1
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
system of competitive bidding.15 The Commission has not always issued
licenses in this manner. Prior to receiving auction authority from Congress in
1993,16 the FCC relied on uncontested hearings, comparative hearings, and
lotteries to grant spectrum licenses to applicants.7
Congress directed the Commission to "promot[e] economic opportunity and
competition" and "avoi[d] excessive concentration of licenses" by awarding
licenses to a "wide variety of applicants."' 8 Congress believed that auctions
would increase spectral efficiency by issuing licenses to those who considered
spectrum the most valuable and auctions could assign spectrum to licensees in
a timelier manner than comparative hearings. 19
Auctions have been a reasonably effective way to assign spectrum licenses
that productively use the airwaves. However, the state of commercial radio
spectrum does not necessarily reflect market-based realities due to what some
have called the Commission's command-and-control approach. 20 For example,
the FCC "allocate[s] spectrum into bands, prescribe[s] the services for which
most of these bands may be used, and supervise[s] the process of assigning
exclusive usage rights to particular licenses" 21 rather than assigning spectrum
for flexible uses.22 Additionally, the FCC statutory framework restricts
licensees' property interests in spectrum because buyers or lessees in any
secondary market transactions must use the spectrum for the same service for
which the FCC has assigned the license.23
The FCC's ability to encourage the most efficient use of spectrum is limited
because the statutory mechanisms for managing commercial spectrum tend to
suppress the Commission's capability to repurpose spectrum with market-
based solutions. The Commission repurposes spectrum either by revoking,
15 Id. § 309() (exempting public safety radio services, broadcast licensees replacing
analog signals with digital television service, noncommercial educational broadcast stations,
and public broadcast stations from auctions).
16 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
17 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 236 (2007) [hereinafter DIGITAL
CROSSROADS]; Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945); Johnston
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 353-54, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)
(2006).
Is 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3). See also FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293,
296 (2003).
1 About Auctions, FCC, http://commcns.org/s7e2mM (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
20 See, e.g., DIGITAL CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at 238; NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN,
supra note 5, at 78-79; FCC SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE SPECTRUM
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 2-5 (2002).
21 DIGITAL CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at 239.
22 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN OVERVIEW, supra note 4, at 530.
23 DIGITAL CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at 231, 243.
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revisiting, and revising spectrum allocations24 or by using coercive authority.25
However, each of these two mechanisms suffers drawbacks. First, repurposing
spectrum by revisiting and revising allocations takes an average of six to
thirteen years.26 Second, the Commission's legal authority to repurpose
spectrum forcefully is limited in practice by the various legal remedies
available to licensees, which often mire the Commission in litigation. 27 For
example, the Supreme Court reversed the FCC's cancellation and proposed re-
auction of NextWave's licenses as a consequence for the licensee's failure to
28
make installment payments.
The FCC's auction authority terminates September 30, 2012.29 The
Commission's budget for fiscal year 2012 proposes that Congress extend the
FCC's current auction authority indefinitely in light of this September 30
expiration date. 30 Moreover, the budget proposes that Congress grant the FCC
authority to implement voluntary incentive auctions as a means to encourage
the best and most efficient use of spectrum.31
B. Trends in Mobile Wireless Technology
FCC licenses spectrum to facilities-based mobile wireless providers that
offer commercial voice and data services to consumers over shared
frequencies.32 This group is comprised of companies that provide the
commercial networks on which Americans rely to operate their smartphones,
wireless data cards, and mobile Wi-Fi hotspots.33 Although these devices are
increasingly popular, they consume a great deal of bandwidth, straining
spectrum capacity and congesting the shared network.34
24 See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (2006). See also NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at
79.
25 FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 308 n.5 (2003) (stating that
"after NextWave prepared a plan of reorganization the FCC asserted that the licenses had
been automatically cancelled and gave notice of its intent to reauction them.").
26 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 79 exhibit 5-C.
27 See, e.g., FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
28 See id.
29 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(11) (Supp. III 2009).
30 FCC, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET ESTIMATES SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS 6 (2011)
[hereinafter FCC BUDGET FY 2012].
31 Id.
32 See 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, f 26-38 (separating wireless spectrum
licensees into (1) facilities-based, (2) resale/mobile virtual network operator providers, (3)
narrowband data providers, and (4) MSS Providers).
33 Id. TT 138, 144-46.
34 Id T 136-47. See also Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Seizing the
Mobile Moment: Spectrum Allocation Policy for the Wireless Broadband Century, 19
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 65-66 (2010) [hereinafter Seizing the Mobile Moment].
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The facilities-based mobile wireless industry has undergone a data
revolution from its voice-centric roots.35 Mobile devices were used initially to
make phone calls and nothing else, but today's consumers download
applications on their mobile devices for nearly innumerable purposes.36
Consumers are adopting mobile data services at an exponential rate. The FCC
found that "the number of mobile data subscribers [in the United States] more
than doubled from 2005 to 2009 and 42 percent of consumers carried a
smartphone in 2009, compared to only 15 percent in 2006."37 Younger
generations are adopting mobile data services even more rapidly, as well. For
example, Pew Research reported that "81% of adults between the ages 18 and
29 are wireless internet users." 38 Employing mobile broadband compatible
devices at formative ages assures that the younger generation will insist on
continued, convenient access to the Internet in the future. To meet the
projected consumer demand for data services, facilities-based carriers currently
are rolling out nationwide next-generation IP-based networks such as Long-
Term Evolution ("LTE") and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access ("WiMax"). 39
Consumers' use of mobile services has also caused data traffic to surge. For
example, mobile data usage increased 2.6 times from 2009 to 201040 and
market conditions suggest that this trend will likely increase in coming years.41
Studies indicate that consumers will demand more mobile data services
thereby increasing data traffic on existing spectrum that providers struggle to
manage now.42 The FCC estimated that mobile data traffic will grow "more
than twenty times by 2013 . . . reaching thirty-five times 2009 levels by
2014."43 Cisco Systems predicted that "[m]obile data traffic will grow at a
3 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, 181-84.
36 See Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://commcns.org/uml6h4 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011;
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Dec. 15, 2011); Seizing the Mobile
Moment, supra note 34, at 22.
3 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at 11708 (Baker, Comm'r, concurring).
38AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEw RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA & MOBILE INTERNET
USE AMONG TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 4 (2010).
3 See Robert Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Telecommunications Policy: Why the iPhone Won't
Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote Its Successor, 8 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 313, 345 (2010); Robert W. Crandall, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, &
Robert E. Litan, Vertical Separation of Telecommunications Networks: Evidence from Five
Countries, 62 FED. CoMM. L. J. 493, 535 (2009).
40 David Samo, Worldwide Mobile Data Traffic Exploding, Nearly Tripled in 2010, Cisco
Says, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2011), http://commcns.org/vDaaqY.
4 See COMMISSION SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
42 John Cox, Smartphones, Data Hogs Causing Wireless Network Capacity Crunch,
NETWORK WORLD (Nov. 16, 2010), http://commcns.org/tjdN4G (stating that "two thirds of
wireless carriers say their networks are suffering due to the surge in data traffic").
43 COMMISSION SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
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[compound annual growth rate] of [ninety-two] percent from 2010 to 2015."4
Even the most conservative projections predict mobile data traffic to increase
by nearly twenty-five percent before the end of 2015.45 Regardless of where
the precise growth factor ultimately lies, the salient point is that increased
adoption and data traffic likely will outrun the services offered by devices that
have enabled the success of the mobile industry thus far.
The United States boasts the largest wireless device market in the world,
comprised of "at least 33 companies manufacturing more than 630 unique
devices for the U.S. market."46 The trajectory of best-selling wireless devices
over the past five years illustrates that this market rapid evolved as more
consumers adopted mobile broadband services.47 In 2005, the best selling
48
cellular device was the Motorola RAZR. However, the popularity of the
RAZR declined shortly after the Apple iPhone topped the mobile handset sales
chart in 2008.49 As of publication, devices using the Android platform have
surpassed the Apple iPhone.50 The United States is "at the threshold of mobile
broadband use, which will combine the must-have wireless device with the
must-have content of the Internet."5 1
Chairman Genachowski noted that mobile broadband is "an essential
platform for new products, economic growth and job creation." 52 Innovation in
mobile wireless is important not only to meet consumer demand, but also to
" Cisco MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
45 See COMMISSION SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 2, at 94.
46 In re Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on the State of Mobile
Wireless Competition, Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, WT Docket No. 10-
133, at 20 (Jul. 30, 2010).
47 Demand for Mobile Broadband Drives HSPA Past 500 Million Connections as the
Mobile Data Revolution Continues, GSM WORLD (June 8, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tKvw60.
See, e.g., Daniel Greenberg, Cellphone Crib Sheet, Cutting Through All the Talk,
WASH. PosT (Nov. 26, 2006), http://commcns.org/vGjG3P. See also Stacey Higginbotham
& Om Malik, Forget the iPhone, Can Droid Top the RAZR?, GIGAOM.COM (Oct. 28, 2009),
http://commcns.org/uFpm7L.
Alana Semuels, Razr Loses Sales Edge to iPhone in Shift to Functional Fashion; More
U.S. Adults Bought Apple's Device, but Standard Keypads Are Up and Coming, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2008), http://commcns.org/tRAPu6.
50 See Mobile & Smartphone Trends, NIELSEN.COM, http://commcns.org/uTLhQK(last
visited Dec. 15, 2011). See also Android Shakes Up the US. Smartphone Market, THENPD
GROUP (May 10, 2010), http://commcns.org/u976Rp; Rob Pegoraro & Sonja Ryst, Apple
Admits iPhone 4 Problem; Software is Flawed Issue Unlikely to Dampen Demand for
Smartphone, WASH. POST (July 3, 2010), http://commcns.org/srS4jn; Kevin C. Tofel,
Android Sales Overtake iPhone in the US., GIGAOM.COM (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://commcns.org/smcCOm.
Daniel L. Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62 FED. COMM.
L.J. 13, 51 (2010).
52 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery: CTIA
Wireless 2011 (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/tC5mcm.
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spur the U.S. economy.53 The United States recently faced a recession in which
the unemployment rate and national public debt increased contemporaneously
with the mobile data revolution. 54 Nonetheless, the mobile wireless industry
has been a source of stability and revenue, contributing investment, jobs, and
increased productivity to the U.S. economy.55 For example, "[b]y the end of
2009, U.S. wireless carriers' cumulative capital expenditures totaled more than
$285 billion, an increase of more than $20 billion from year-end 2008," despite
the economic downtum56 Wireless carriers use this capital to deploy
infrastructure such as towers and cell sites, build equipment such as spectral
efficiency mechanisms, and offer innovative services and devices to
consumers.57
Investment in mobile broadband deployment also leads to increased
employment opportunities because increased deployment creates an "effect []
similar to building a roadway, which not only generates jobs and income for
the builders of the road, but also provides opportunities for others to create
new businesses and homes along the roadway."58 Chairman Genachowski
recognized this roadway analogy when he called for "a laser-like focus on our
'invisible infrastructure"' to create new jobs, products, and services that will
help improve the lives of Americans.59 Moreover, mobile broadband services
have increased job productivity by allowing workers to read and answer e-
mails on their own schedules and heed their customers' requests. 60
s3 In re Promoting More Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Dynamic Spectrum Use
Technologies, Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 16632, 16655 (Nov. 30, 2010); In re
Promoting Expanded Opportunities for Radio Experimentation and Market Trials under Part
5 of the Commission's Rules and Streamlining Other Related Rules; 2006 Biennial Review
of Telecommunications Regulations - Part 2 Administered by the Office of Engineering and
Technology (OET), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.R 16544, 1-2 (Nov. 30,
2010).
54 Household Data Annual Averages: 1. Employment Status of the Civilian
Noninstitutional Population, 1940 to Date, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, available at
http://commcns.org/va3LKK (last visited Dec. 15, 2011); U.S. TREASURY, DEBT POSITION
AND ACTIVITY REPORT JULY 2011, available at http://commcns.org/sJh7AJ (last visited Dec.
15, 2011).
5514th Wireless Report, supra note 1, T 225.
56 In re Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on the State of Mobile
Wireless Competition, Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, WT Docket No. 10-
133, at 20 (July 30, 2010).
5 See 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, T 4.
58 Alan Pearce & Michael S. Pagano, Accelerated Wireless Broadband Infrastructure
Defloyment: The Impact on GDP and Employment, 17 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 11, 13 (2009).
Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Prepared Remarks, FCC Spectrum Summit:
Unleashing America's Invisible Infrastructure at 2 (Oct. 21, 2010), available at
http://commens.org/t7tLoz.
o ROGER ENTNER, CTIA WIRELESS, THE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IMPACT OF WIRELESS
BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY AND SERVICES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 2 (2008); Jana M.
Luttenegger, Smartphones: Increasing Productivity, Creating Overtime Liability, 36 IOWA J.
[Vol. 20170
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C. The Importance of Unleashing Spectrum for Mobile Broadband
President Obama's goal to provide ninety-eight percent of the country with
next-generation, high-speed wireless coverage recognizes the myriad benefits
of mobile broadband services. However, the National Broadband Plan
cautioned that without new spectrum for mobile broadband, the nation risks
"higher prices, poor service quality, an inability for the United States to
compete internationally, depressed demand and, ultimately, a drag on
innovation."62 Therefore, to "connect[] every part of America to the digital
age," President Obama emphasized the need to unleash adequate spectrum
for wireless networks to have the capacity to support commercial networks,
devices, and applications.
Spectrum capacity relates to the amount of data a network can carry and
depends on three factors: spectral efficiency of wireless technologies, the
number of cell cites used to provide service, and available spectrum.65 Wireless
companies use internal resources to improve spectral efficiency and deploy
wireless infrastructure to improve spectrum capacity, but their most
important asset-spectrum-is obtained through the FCC or through
acquisition.67 For example, six out of the seven strategic rationales for AT&T
and T-Mobile's proposed $39 million merger-acquisition centered on
combating spectrum constraints to increase mobile broadband coverage in
America.68 While AT&T ended its bid to buy T-Mobile,69 the FCC recently
approved AT&T's purchase of spectrum from Qualcomm, Inc. 70 Additionally,
the FCC is in the midst of reviewing a proposed deal under which Verizon
CORP. L. 259, 273-74 (2010).
61 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address
(Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/tUDM4Y.62 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 77.63 State of the Union Address, supra note 61.
6 Memorandum from The White House Office of the Press Sec'y to the Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts & Agencies on Unleashing the Wireless Broadband Revolution (June 28, 2010),
available at http://commcns.org/vuRbZ9 (instructing the Secretary of Commerce, through
the NTIA, to collaborate with the FCC to identify and make available spectrum for
commercial mobile broadband use).
65 See COMMISSION SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.66 Seizing the Mobile Moment, supra note 34, at 27; Ross H. Ernst, Network Capacity
Where Required, OSP MAGAZINE (Sept. 2006), http://commcns.org/s4uZQ7.
67 See discussion, supra Part II.A.
68 AT&T and T-Mobile USA: The Future of Mobile Broadband,
MOBILIZEEVERYTHING.COM, http://commcns.org/rLvYZs (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).69 Cecilia Kang, AT&T Gives Up on T-Mobile Merger, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2011),
httV://commcns.org/uaYOqG.
In re Application of AT&T Inc. and Qualcomm Incorporated for Consent to Assign
Licenses and Authorizations, Order, FCC 11-188, WT Docket No. I 1-18 (Dec. 22, 2011),
available at http://commcns.org/s4Xwv8.
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Wireless has purchased spectrum from three cable giants.71
Instead of eradicating whatever competition in mobile wireless that still
exists,72 some frequencies in existing spectrum bands must be repurposed to
avert a mobile spectrum crisis and meet consumer demand. The National
Broadband Plan determined that frequency allocations in the spectrum bands
between 225 MHz and 3.7 GHz would best serve mobile broadband,73 which
FCC licensees and federal government users currently occupy. 74 As discussed
below, the FCC is likely to apportion spectrum dedicated for broadcast
television and mobile satellite service ("MSS") for mobile broadband from
these bands because the current licensees manage frequencies that are adjacent
to existing mobile wireless spectrum bands.75
III. STAKEHOLDERS' INTERESTS AND GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
The FCC must balance the needs of major stakeholders-the commercial
mobile wireless, broadcast television, and MSS industries-to accomplish its
objective of repurposing spectrum for mobile broadband services. At this
point, the FCC has begun its spectrum-repurposing goal, while Congress
contemplates legislation authorizing the agency to implement voluntary
incentive auctions. The industry stakeholders' interests, as well as the Federal
government's progress in repurposing spectrum for mobile broadband, are
examined in this part of the Note.
7 Press Release, Verizon Wireless, Comcast, Time Warner, And Bright House Networks
Sell Advanced Wireless Spectrum to Verizon Wireless for $3.6 Billion (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://commcns.org/t4fPHO.
2 "An Act to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the
rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Telecommunications Act of
1996, 104 Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (emphasis added); Eyder Peralta, Would
AT&T Merger With T-Mobile Hurt Consumers?, NPR BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://commcns.org/sR8ctP. The merger also may violate antitrust law, but that analysis is
beyond the scope of this Note.
3 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 75, 80, 84.
74 Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocations in the United States, NAT'L. TELECOM. INFO.
Assoc., http://commcns.org/t7LISo (last updated Dec. 2005).
7 See generally NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, 75-98; In re Innovation in
the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and Improvements to VHF,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.R. 16,498, TT 1-3 (Nov. 30, 2010) [hereinafter
Broadcast Innovation NPRMJ; In re Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite
Service Bands at 1525-1559 MHz and 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-
2500 MHz, and 2000-2020 MHz and 2180-2200 MHz, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Notice oflnquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 9481 (July 15, 2010) [hereinafter MSS NPRM].
76 Incentive Auctions, FCC, http://commcns.org/rK4pRU (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
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A. Stakeholders' Interests
This section first delves further into the arguments of facilities-based
wireless licensees that additional spectrum is needed within a short time
period. Next, it discusses the downward trending market for broadcast
television and analyzes broadcast television licensees' advocacy efforts to
orchestrate incentive auctions in a way that can fully protect their interests.
Finally, it addresses MSS licensees' attempts to supply additional spectrum for
mobile broadband.
1. Facilities-Based Wireless Licensees
Due to the constraints on wireless commercial networks,
telecommunications industry leaders warned that innovation in mobile
broadband technologies will halt without additional frequencies at the FCC's
Spectrum Summit in October 2010.7 On the same day, the FCC released a
report estimating that the demand for mobile data will exceed capacity by
2013.78 Wireless industry representatives posit that the Commission's
prediction underestimates the proliferation of consumers using smart mobile
devices that rely on commercial networks.79 Notwithstanding, industry
personnel and the Commission agree that current spectrum allocations for
mobile broadband cannot satisfy presumptive usage growth. Spectrum
therefore must be freed to support further innovation in mobile wireless
technology.8 1
The mobile wireless industry is willing to pay for additional spectrum, as
well.82 Commercial mobile licensees have purchased spectrum in past FCC
auctions at $2.67, $1.29, and $0.978 per MHz-POP.83 Extrapolating these
spectrum valuations, 120 MHz of broadcast television spectrum would be
valued at approximately $99 billion, $48 billion, or $36 billion, respectively.
n Memorandum from Wilkinson Barker Knauer LLP on Summary of FCC's Spectrum
Summit (Oct. 22, 2010) (on file with author).
78 See COMMISSION SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
7 Howard Buskirk & Yu-Ting Wang, Genachowski Renews Warnings of Spectrum
Crisis, COMM. DAILY, at 2 (Oct. 22, 2010).
80 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 75.
8 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN OVERVIEW, supra note 4, at 529.
82 See BROADCAST SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTIONS, supra note 12, at 12.
83 "Dollars per megahertz of spectrum, per person reached ($ per megahertz-pop) is the
convention used to estimate the market value of spectrum." NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN,
supra note 5, at 102 n.86. See BROADCAST SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTIONs, supra note 12,
at 8.
8 See BROADCAST SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTIONS, supra note 12, at 8. But see JEFFREY
A. EISENBACH, REVENUES FROM A POSSIBLE SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTIONS: WHY THE
CTIA/CEA ESTIMATE IS NOT RELIABLE 1 (2011) (explaining that the precise revenues from
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This comparison is not an entirely precise gauge, however, because wireless
carriers would consider the following factors to increase market value: lower
frequency bands, larger swaths of spectrum in terms of bandwidth, and
spectrum in markets with greater population densities. Wireless carriers are
likely to pay more for lower frequencies because they can support greater data
throughput and provide enhanced propagation features in these bands. 6
Carriers would regard larger swaths of spectrum in terms of bandwidth as more
valuable because effective LTE services require contiguous frequencies.87
Lastly, greater population densities would garner more attention from wireless
carriers because spectrum is congested in these market areas, which is where
more potential customers reside.
2. Broadcast Television Licensees
Broadcast television licensees offer free, over-the-air ("OTA") television via
6 MHz channels licensed by the FCC. Broadcast television spectrum is
celebrated for its desirable propagation characteristics,89 yet only ten percent of
U.S. consumers utilize free OTA television because most consumers choose to
subscribe to pay-TV services that are not delivered through the airwaves. 90
Consequently, the wireless industry suggests that a portion of the broadcast
television spectrum should be repurposed for mobile broadband because "the
benefits of over-the-air broadcast can be enjoyed by virtually every American
citizen without the use of over-the-air broadcast spectrum."91
Trends in OTA broadcast television and mobile broadband services are at
odds with Congress' directive for the FCC to promote efficient use of
proposed incentive auctions are unknowable because the structure of the auctions is not
determined and history of auctions cannot be relied upon).
85 JOHN STONE & MATTHEW YUKELSON, NEAR EARTH LLC, WIRELESS SPECTRUM:
INVISIBLE REAL ESTATE 5, 16, 28 (2008).
86 MOTOROLA, INC., SPECTRUM ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE LTE DEPLOYMENTS 3 (2008);
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 85.
87 MOTOROLA, INC., MOTOROLA LTE SOLUTIONS: THE TD-LTE ADVANTAGE 3 (2010).
8 Hearing to Address Spectrum and Public Safety Issues Before the H. Subcomm. on
Commc'ns & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
(statement of Sen. Gordon H. Smith, President and Chief Executive Officer, National
Association of Broadcasters). See also Television Broadcast Stations, 47 C.F.R. § 73.601
(2010).
89 See, e.g., Henry A. Waxman, Opportunities and Challenges in an Ever-Evolving
Communications Landscape, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS i, v (2010).
90 See FCC, OBI TECHNICAL PAPER No. 3, SPECTRUM ANALYSIS: OPTIONS FOR BROADCAST
SPECTRUM 7 exhibit A (2010) (the majority of Americans subscribe to satellite and cable
pay-tv services).
1 In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and
Improvements to VHF, Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, ET Docket No. 10-
235, at 7 (Mar. 18, 2011) (italics in original).
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commercial spectrum. Though the Commission would like to carry out the
National Broadband Plan's recommendation of repurposing 120 MHz of
92broadcast television spectrum for mobile broadband, its revisiting and
revising process takes an average of six to thirteen years and forcible spectrum
repurposing faces seemingly interminable judicial review.93 Additionally, even
if a broadcast television licensee initiated a private transaction to sell its
spectrum rights, the buyer would be required to continue providing broadcast
television with its newly acquired spectrum. 94 The Commission requested that
Congress authorize it to conduct voluntary incentive auctions because the
FCC's current statutory is not enough to meet Congressional intent of
promoting efficient use in a timely manner.95
The National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") maintains that they do
not oppose voluntary incentive auctions, but their lobbying efforts likely will
be the FCC's biggest obstacle in acquiring voluntary incentive auction
authority.96 NAB joined with broadcast TV networks and organizations to
launch the Future of TV Coalition in November 2011, 7 an entity through
which NAB intends "to reassert [itselfj in the debate" over contemplated
voluntary incentive auction legislation.98 The coalition's website - a website
sponsored by NAB - urges Website visitors to "take action now" 99 and "Tell
Your Member of Congress" that proposed spectrum auctions "threaten" local
TV without protecting TV viewers like the Website visitor herself 100 Though
arguably vehement in attempting to persuade constituents to engage their
members of Congress on this issue, the NAB/Coalition website neither refers
to the broadcast industry's contrary advocacy position on voluntary incentive
auction authority nor identifies the full nature of the contemplated
92 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 76, 84, 88-89.
9 See discussion, supra Part IIA.
94 See DIGITAL CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at 243.
9s See FCC BUDGET FY 2012, supra note 30, at 6.
Advocacy, NAT'L Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, http://commcns.org/sNHQde (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011). For example, in the early 2000s, local broadcasters effectively quashed
attempts to reform the FM radio spectrum with "no political constituency of comparable
significance on the other side of [the] debate." See DIGITAL CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at
241.
Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, The Future of TV Coalition Launches to
Support Preservation of Free and Local Television (Nov. 1, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/sB1Jux.
Juliana Gruenwald, New Broadcaster Coalition Says Future of TV Is Bright, NAT'L J.
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://commens.orglu5TGks (quoting Gordon Smith, President and CEO,
Nat'l Ass'n of Broads.).
99 THE FUTURE OF TV.ORG, http://commcns.org/vhwpQR (last visited Dec. 15, 2011);
Terms of Use, NAB.ORG, http://commcns.org/updidk (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
100 Take Action Now!, THE FUTURE OF TV, http://commcns.org/sYssCv (last visited Dec.
15, 2011).
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legislation.' 0' The Future of TV Coalition simply demonstrates the extent to
which NAB elicits support for action that the trade association tolerates as long
as adequate protections for incumbent broadcast TV licensees.102
In its official comments filed with the FCC and in hearings before Congress,
NAB requests that Congress direct the FCC to complete two tasks prior to
incentivizing any incumbent licensees to offer spectrum for competitive
bidding.103 First, NAB proposes that any legislation would require the FCC to
perform a spectrum inventory to explore technical solutions in existing flexible
use bands.104 Second, NAB asks Congress and the FCC to ensure that every
element of the contemplated incentive auction authority be completely
voluntary in order to further the public interest. 0 5 These demands would be
problematic for the Commission because a spectrum inventory could delay
incentive auctions and a completely voluntary requirement could imply that
non-participating broadcasters' technical specifications and regulatory rights
should be wholly unaffected if Congress acts.106
Nonetheless, the Federal government has mechanisms to address NAB's
two-fold request.107 With regards to a spectrum inventory, the FCC already has
begun to assess how spectrum is used through its Spectrum Dashboard, an
initial inquiry into a more comprehensive inventory that the Chairman has
vowed to continue.108 Members of Congress also have included spectrum
inventories in proposed legislation.109 However, the Commission maintains
101 Shaping the Future, THE FUTURE OF TV, http://commcns.org/vbzelQ (last visited Dec.
15, 2011). The Coalition/NAB Website explains that the "federal government is making
decisions" yet the legislation contemplates only voluntary incentive auctions and the
Website also documents that "advancing the future of [OTA TV] and wireless services are
not mutually exclusive goals" though NAB maintains in hearing testimony and FCC filings
that both can be accomplished with the right legislation. Id.
102 Brendan Sasso, Feud Between Wireless Companies and Broadcasters Turns Ugly, THE
HILL (Nov. 2, 2011), http://commcns.org/wOKPKu.
103 Promoting Broadband, Jobs and Economic Growth Through Commercial Spectrum
Auctions: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Todd F. Schurz, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Schurz Communications, Inc., on behalf of the National
Association of Broadcasters), available at http://commcns.org/rqKIbr.
'" Id. at 15-17.
"os Id. at 4.
106 Id. See also Larry Downes, I Want My Spectrum Inventory, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://commcns.org/twzfd3.
07 See generally OBI TECHNICAL PAPER No. 3, supra note 90.
08 Spectrum Dashboard, REBOOT.FCC.GOV, http://commcns.org/t9Vxmd (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011); Net Neutrality and Internet Regulation, Warranted or More Economic
Harm than Good: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech. of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Julius Genachowski,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission).
109 See, e.g., Reforming Airwaves by Developing Incentives and Opportunistic Sharing
(RADIOS) Act, S. 455, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless
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that an inventory depends on a particular allocation, so rather than reviewing
assignments across the full electromagnetic spectrum, the Commission intends
to assess usage in the spectrum bands between 225 MHz and 3.7 GHz. 0
With regards to the second request, the FCC compiled a comprehensive
technical paper to analyze how spectrum can be repurposed on a completely
voluntary basis and identified reasons why broadcasters would be interested in
participating in voluntary incentive auctions. HI For example, a broadcast
licensee may realize that their spectrum is more valuable in an auction than in
its current use or that it could continue broadcasting in HDTV while sharing a
portion of their six MHz channel.112 However, broadcasters commented that
the technical paper's conclusions require further examination before the FCC
can determine its proposed auctions would be voluntary and serve the public
interest. 113
3. MSS Licensees
MSS provides mobile broadband services via satellite on spectrum bands
with excellent propagation characteristics.1 14 Unlike facilities-based wireless
licensees, MSS providers do not offer retail mobile and data services to typical
American consumers.115 Instead, MSS consumers include "the oil industry,
maritime users, public safety agencies, and other government/military
Innovation Act, S. 28, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011).
110 William Lake, Chief, Media Bureau, FCC, Remarks to the National Alliance of State
Broadcaster Associations: The FCC's Incentive Auction Proposal: New Options for
Broadcasters (Feb. 28, 2011), available at http://commens.org/tkCdL9. The FCC's White
Spaces Order attempts to ensure that spectrum is used more flexibly by reserving spectrum
for unlicensed mobile broadband use in unused frequencies of the broadcast television band.
However, the FCC's Office of Engineering and Technology must develop a geo-location
database to prevent interference in the television band before anyone can take advantage of
the FCC's flexible approach to spectrum management. Only when it completes its
comprehensive inventory of the 225 MHz to 3.7 GHz frequency bands and culminates the
White Spaces proceeding will the FCC satisfy the first of NAB's two requests. See
generally Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,814 (Dec. 6,
2010) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0 and 15).
" OBI TECHNICAL PAPER No. 3, supra note 90, at 4.
112Id. at 1.
113 See In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing
and Improvements to VHF, Comments of Cox Media Group, Inc., ET Docket No. 10-235, at
2 (Mar. 18, 2011); In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel
Sharing and Improvements to VHF, Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters
and the Association for Maximum Service Television, Inc., ET Docket No. 10-235, at 11-12
(Mar. 18, 2011).
114 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, 36; NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5,
at 87.
115 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, 36.
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operations."ll6 The FCC has exercised its ability to grant MSS licensees the
flexibility to modify their services. Specifically, operators of MSS may apply
to supplement these mission-critical services by re-using the same frequencies
to operate terrestrial base stations and mobile terminals along with its space
station. 11 In addition, Congress authorized the Commission to decide whether
MSS would be considered a Title II common carrier. 1s The FCC has
promulgated that most MSS licensees providing commercial mobile radio
service directly to end users are subject to Title II regulations.11 9 This flexible
allowance, along with the MSS spectrum band's superior propagation
characteristics, has led the FCC to set a goal of dedicating 90 MHz in the MSS
spectrum bands for accelerated mobile broadband infrastructure build-out by
2015.120
The biggest concern of MSS licensees-is whether their investments will be
protected. 121 Having invested tremendous capital to launch satellites into orbit
and comply with relevant international rules, licensees fear that the FCC's goal
of efficient spectrum use will not account for the complex deployment issues
unique to their industry.122 Meanwhile, the FCC has granted waivers to MSS
applicants seeking to make their spectrum available for flexible use by
facilities-based wireless services.123 For example, LightSquared obtained an
FCC waiver and invested millions of dollars to deploy a wholesale, nation-
wide, next-generation LTE network for commercial service providers.124 Both
116 Id.
117 47 U.S.C. § 303(y) (2006); In re Flexibility for Delivery of Communications by
Mobile Satellite Service Providers in the 2 GHz Band, the L-Band, and the 1.6/2.4 GHz
Bands; Review of the Spectrum Sharing Plan Among Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit
Mobile Satellite Service Systems in the 1.6/2.4 GHz Bands, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 1962 (2003), modified by Order on Reconsideration, 18
F.C.C.R. 13590 (2003), reconsidered in part in Mem. Opinion and Order and Second Order
on Reconsideration, 20 F.C.C.R. 4616 (2005) ("ATC Second Reconsideration Order");
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 87-88.
1147 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2006).
119 47 C.F.R. § 20.9(a)(10) (reserving its power to authorize MSS licensees, providing a
space segment for CMRS are regulated on a non-common carrier basis).
120 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra, note 5, at 84.
121 See e.g., In re Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite Service Bands at
1525-1559 MHz and 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz, and
2000-2020 MHz and 2180-2200 MHz, Comments of GlobalStar Inc., ET Docket No. 10-
142, at 25-26 (Sept. 30, 2010).
122 See e.g., Satellite Indus. Ass'n, Satellite Industry Association's Views on the 2008
President's Budget Request Re: Spectrum Auctions and Fees, http://commcns.org/uo4jJr
(last visited Dec. 15, 2011); Comments of GlobalStar Inc., supra note 121, at 26.
123 See, e.g., In re LightSquared Subsidiary LLC; Request for Modification of its
Authority for an Ancillary Terrestrial Component, Order and Authorization, 26 F.C.C.R.
566 (Jan. 26, 2011).
124 See generally In re Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite Service Bands at
1525-1559 MHz and 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz, and
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BestBuy and Leap Wireless have contracted with LightSquared to use its LTE
network, which the company had hoped to unveil in the first quarter of 2012.'25
Although LightSquared claims that its LTE network will "transform[] the
U.S. wireless industry," its deployment may be delayed due to interference
concerns.126 Specifically, the Departments of Defense and Transportation have
expressed concerns over the potential interference that LightSquared's network
could cause to GPS technologies.127 As a result, the FCC required
LightSquared to work with GPS companies to examine interference issues and
report its findings to the Commission before Lightsquared can proceed with its
wholesale-only wireless broadband network business proposal.128 The FCC
issued a Public Notice in September 2011 stating that additional testing is
needed to ensure terrestrial services offered by LightSquared will not cause
harmful interference with GPS operations.129 As this article is sent to
publication, it appears that LightSquared has racketed up their lobbying efforts
to fight the uphill battle against GPS manufacturers and federal agencies as
MSS licensee prepares for another interference test upcoming during January
2012.130
B. Government Action
The concerns of these industries reflect the significant lengths companies
will take to protect their spectrum from being repurposed forcibly for another
use. 3 Congress and the FCC recognize that spectrum is a critical asset for
these and other industries to provide radio services effectively to end users, as
evidenced by each entity's repeated policy objective to avoid harmful
interference from and to neighboring frequencies. This section explicates the
2000-2020 MHz and 2180-2200 MHz, Comments of LightSquared Subsidiary LLC, ET
Docket No. 10-142 (Sept. 15, 2010).
125 LightSquared Plans to Offer 4G Nationwide: CEO, CNBC.coM (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://commcns.org/rJhDfh.
26 About Us, LIGHTSQUARED.COM, http://commcns.org/ryiL3o (last visited Dec. 15,
20 11).
127 Amy Schatz, Pentagon Raises Concerns About LightSquared Wireless, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://commcns.org/u5QVKR.
128 id.
129 Status of Testing In Connection with LightSquared's Request for ATC Commercial
Operating Authority, Public Notice, DA 11-1537, IB Docket No. 11-109 (Sept. 13, 2011).130 Josh Smith, Weathering Political Criticism, LightSquared Takes on Detractors, NAT'L
J. (Oct. 26, 2011), http://commcns.org/sb6Gof. See also Stephen Lawson, LightSquared
Slams Leak on GPS Tests, Expects to Win, PC WORLD (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://commcns.org/sq3WKp.
1 See, e.g., FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns. Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003)
(demonstrating that after the FCC forcefully revoked NextWave's spectrum to reauction it
due to non-payments, the carrier challenged the FCC all the way to the Supreme Court even
after filing for bankruptcy in order to keep its spectrum license).
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regulatory proceedings and proposed legislation designed to foster incumbent
FCC licensees' interests and the National Broadband Plan's goal of
repurposing additional spectrum for mobile broadband.
1. The Federal Communications Commission
In order to auction existing bands of spectrum for mobile broadband use, the
Commission has taken steps to ensure that commercial spectrum is being used
efficiently and effectively. Specifically, the FCC plans to make 300 MHz of
spectrum available by 2015 from the following commercial spectrum bands:
(1) 20 MHz in Wireless Communications Services ("WCS"), (2) 90 MHz in
MSS, (3) 120 MHz in broadcast television, and (4) 60 MHz in Advanced
Wireless Services 2/3 ("AWS"). 132 The agency has opened docket proceedings
for the WCS, MSS, and broadcast television spectrum bands, but has yet to
open inquiry into the National Broadband Plan's AWS spectrum band
recommendation.133
On May 20, 2010, the FCC released a Report and Order ("WCS Order")
amending WCS rules to make 25 MHz of spectrum available immediately.134
This 25 MHz was located in the 2.3 GHz band shared by Satellite Digital
Audio Radio Service ("SDARS") and WCS.135 The WCS Order requires WCS
to be available to forty percent of a license service area's population within
three and a half years. However, the WCS Order may fail to meet the
Commission's stated goal of "increas[ing] the supply of flexible use spectrum
that can be used to address the explosive nationwide growth in consumer
demand for mobile broadband services."l37 AT&T challenged the WCS Order
as arbitrary and capricious and filed a petition for partial reconsideration,
noting that the technical requirements deter broadband build-out within the
132 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 84 exhibit 5-E (it should be noted
that the FCC also plans to auction ten MHz of the D-block to public safety, but this article
does not discuss the D-Block reallocation. The conflicting opinions of the FCC, Congress
members, and the Obama Administration regarding the D-Block could be the subject of ajournal article in itself).
133 FCC, National Broadband Plan: Year I Progress Report, BROADBAND.GOV,
http://commcns.org/vb60UR (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
34 In re Amendment of Part 27 of the Commission's Rules to Govern the Operation of
Wireless Communications Services in the 2.3 GHz Band; Establishment of Rules and
Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service in the 2310-2360 MHz Frequency
Band, Report and Order and Second Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 11710 (May 20, 2010)
[hereinafter WCS Order].
135 Id. 1.
13 Id. 3. "The WCS spectrum is separated into paired blocks (A and B) that have been
allocated on a regional basis, and unpaired blocks (C and D) that have been allocated over
ve wide service areas." Id. 1 6, n.1 1.
Id. T 24.
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imposed deadlines.'13  SiriusXM opposed both AT&T's and the WCS
Coalition's petitions for reconsideration, challenging that their technical
arguments either lacked evidence or directly contradicted the FCC's
findings.139 Unfortunately, the National Broadband Plan's goal of unleashing
20 MHz of additional spectrum for licensed mobile broadband use in the WCS
band is on hold until this dispute is settled.140
The FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry
("MSS NPRM") on July 15, 2010.141 The MSS NPRM seeks comment on how
to increase the value of MSS spectrum. To that end, it includes two proposals
to "remove regulatory barriers to terrestrial use" and promote additional
investments in MSS bands.142 The purpose of the proceeding is to increase
flexibility and predictability in spectrum management, while also attracting
investors to terrestrial wireless and protecting satellite interests in facilitating a
90 MHz allocation for mobile broadband in the 2 GHz band. 143 Comments and
reply comments indicate that both facilities-based wireless and MSS licensees
support the Commission's proposals.
In November 2010, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("Broadcast Innovation NPRM") seeking information on how to promote
innovative use of broadcast TV spectrum for mobile broadband while
preserving free, OTA broadcasting without interference.145 Specifically, the
138 In re Amendment of Part 27 of the Commission's Rules to Govern the Operation of
Wireless Communications Services in the 2.3 GHz Band; Establishment of Rules and
Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service in the 2310-2360 MHz Frequency
Band, Petition for Partial Reconsideration, WT Docket No. 07-293, IB Docket No. 95-91,
GEN DocketNo. 90-357, RM-8610, at2-5 (Sept. 1, 2010). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
139 In re Amendment of Part 27 of the Commission's Rules to Govern the Operation of
Wireless Communications Services in the 2.3 GHz Band; Establishment of Rules and
Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service in the 2310-2360 MHz Frequency
Band, SiriusXM Opposition to Petitions for Reconsideration of the WCS Coalition and
AT&TInc., WT Docket No. 07-293, IB Docket No. 95-91, GEN Docket No. 90-357, RM-
8610, at 1-2 (Oct. 18, 2010). See also Tim Warren, FCC Loosens WCS Spectrum Rules,
COMM. DAILY (May 21, 2010) (explaining the significance of Sirius XM's objection
because it was "the most vocal opponent" to the proceeding and the Commission's vote to
pass the WCS Order).
140 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 85-86. The WCS Order attempted
to unleash twenty-five MHz of additional spectrum for mobile broadband use in the WCS
band, but the National Broadband Plan hoped to repurpose twenty MHz,
141 MSS NPRM, supra note 75.
142 Id. % 1-2.
143 id. 3.
1" See In re Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite Service Bands at 1525-
1559 MHz and 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz, and 2000-
2020 MHz and 2180-2200 MHz, Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, ET Docket
No. 10-142 (Sept. 15, 2010); Comments ofLightSquared Subsidiary LLC, supra note 124.
145 In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and
Improvements to VHF, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.R 16498, IT 1-3 (Nov.
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Broadcast Innovation NPRM affects broadcast television stations operating on
spectrum channels 21-51 in the UHF band.146 The proposed rules permit
mobile broadband providers to have co-primary access to the broadcast
television spectrum, allow two broadcast television licensees to share one 6
MHz channel, and seek comment on ways to improve the UHF band.147 The
channel-sharing proposal would allow broadcast licensees to relocate
voluntarily in order to share a 6MHz channel, while retaining must carry rights
and all other rights afforded to it as an FCC licensee. 148 Comments and replies
have been filed in this proceedingl49 and reflect that facilities-based wireless
providers generally support the co-primary access and channel sharing
proposals,150 while the broadcast industry suggests that co-primary use is
premature and demands more information on the structure of channel
sharing.151 If passed, the rules would make co-primary access and channel
sharing the technical foundation for proposed voluntary incentive auctions.152
The Commission also intends to make 60 MHz of spectrum available for
mobile broadband use in the AWS band.153 AWS already has been designated
for mobile broadband, but the FCC has not auctioned 40 MHz in the AWS-2 H
& J and AWS-3 blocks.1 54 The National Broadband Plan called for the
Commission to collaborate with the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration ("NTIA") to determine whether spectrum allocated
for federal government use in the 1755-1850 MHz bands could be reassigned
and paired with the un-auctioned AWS-2/3 blocks for a mobile broadband
30, 2010) [hereinafter Broadcast Innovation NPRAJ.
146 Id. 5-7 ("except for channel 37").
147 Id. 13.
148 Id. 30-4 1.
149 Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands, 76 Fed. Reg. 5521 (Feb. 1, 2011)
(including Comment and Reply Comment due dates for Broadcast Innovation NPRM).
150 See generally In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations,
Channel Sharing and Improvements to VHF, Comments of CTIA - The Wireless
Association, ET Docket No. 10-235, at 12-15 (Mar. 18, 2011); In re Innovation in the
Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and Improvements to VHF,
Comments of T-Mobile USA, Inc., ET Docket No. 10-235, at 7-8 (Mar. 18, 2011); In re
Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and
Improvements to VHF, Comments ofA T&T, ET Docket No. 10-235, at 3-7 (Mar. 18, 2011).
See generally In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations,
Channel Sharing and Improvements to VHF, Comments of National Association of
Broadcasters and The Association for Maximum Service Television, Inc., ET Docket No.
10-235, at 15-19 (Mar. 18, 2011); In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands:
Allocations, Channel Sharing and improvements to VHF, Comments of Sinclair
Broadcasting Group, Inc., ET Docket No. 10-235, at 4-9 (Mar. 18, 2011).
152 Broadcast Innovation NRPM supra note 145, at 16535 (statement of Julius
Genachowski, Chairman, FCC).
See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 76, 84.
154 Jeffrey Rosen, The Future of Spectrum, ISSUES IN TECH., at 7 (Aug. 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/rDvttj.
[Vol. 20182
Voluntary Incentive Auctions
spectrum auction.155 After the Plan was released, NTIA assessed federal
spectrum that could be "fast-tracked" for reassignment to commercial wireless
services. NTIA identified 1695-1710 MHz and 3550-3650 MHz as frequencies
that may be available conditionally for commercial wireless services within
five years, but discounted the coveted 1755-1780 MHz band because the
Federal/military operates in it through the North Atlantic Trade Organization
agreements and others.156 Nonetheless, an AWS Order and auction may be
forthcoming due to one of two reasons. First, the FCC followed up on the
NTIA's "fast track" report by releasing a Public Notice intended to assess
whether current broadband technologies are fit for the spectrum bands that
NTIA identified. 57 Second, the National Broadband Plan encouraged the
Commission to promptly auction the AWS-2/3 bands if pairing the spectrum
blocks to reassigned federal spectrum was not possible.158
In addition to these ongoing and potential proceedings, the FCC has
completed its Spectrum Dashboard, a transparency tool for consumers to
browse spectrum bands' uses and licensees.' 59 Chairman Genachowski stated
that the Spectrum Dashboard was the first step toward the FCC's completion
of a spectrum inventory at a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and Commerce.160 With a comprehensive spectrum
inventory, FCC hopes to assess how efficiently and effectively spectrum is
used in order to meet the National Broadband Plan goal of repurposing 300
MHz of spectrum for mobile broadband by 2015 and an additional 200 MHz
by 2020.161
Finally, as noted in Part IIA, the FCC asked Congress to extend its current
authority to auction spectrum in its 2012 budget proposal, which expires
155 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 86-87.
156 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEAR-TERM VIABILITY OF
ACCOMMODATING WIRELESS BROADBAND SYSTEMS IN THE 1675-1710 MHz, 1755-1780
MHz, 3500-3650 MHz, AND 4200-4220 MHz, 4380-4400 MHz BANDS 1-5 (2010).
Nonetheless, NTIA determined that this band will be a priority in its 10 year spectrum
assessment under the National Broadband Plan goal to unleash 500 MHz of spectrum by
2020. See id
157 Spectrum Task Force Requests Information on Frequency Bands Identified by NTIA
as Potential Broadband Spectrum, Public Notice, 26 F.C.C.R. 3486 (Mar. 8, 2011).
158 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 87.
15 FCC, Spectrum Dashboard, REBOOT.FCC.Gov, http://commcns.org/t9Vxmd (last
visited Dec. 15, 2011). See also Press Release, FCC Announces "Beta" Launch of Spectrum
Dashboard (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/uEG07m (stating that the
Spectrum Dashboard will "increase transparency into how radio spectrum is used in the
United States").
"' Net Neutrality and Internet Regulation: Warranted or More Economic Harm than
Good?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC),
http://commcns.org/tGHSoa.
See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 84.
2011]1 183
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
September 30, 2012.162 It requested that Congress grant the FCC with power to
implement voluntary incentive auctions in order to encourage the most
efficient use of commercial spectrum and address the pending capacity crisis
facing mobile broadband providers.163
2. Congress
President Obama also has urged Congress to pass legislation authorizing the
FCC to conduct voluntary incentive auctions in order to provide the nation
with coverage for next-generation wireless services.164 Members of Congress,
working on a bipartisan basis, have recognized that spectrum reform is
necessary to enable wireless providers to meet consumer demand for mobile
data services. However, some members are reluctant to sacrifice OTA
broadcast television because it brings a number of benefits to their
constituents.166 Therefore, they have stressed that any incentive auction scheme
must be truly voluntary and avoid forceful repurposing of spectrum for mobile
broadband use.167
The 112th Congress has considered authorizing the FCC to conduct
voluntary incentive auctions in at least eight bills focused primarily on
spectrum reform, as well as in several amendments to bills targeted at reducing
the national public debt. Each bill mandates the sharing of auction proceeds
between the U.S. Treasury and incumbent licensee participants and, except for
one, extends the FCC's current statutory authority to conduct traditional
auctions for spectrum. The focus of this section, however, is the differences of
each of the bills, including how each bill grants the Commission its new
authority.
162 FCC BUDGET FY 2012, supra note 30, at 6.
163 id
1 See OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 39-40 (2011). See also Press Release, The
White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Details Plan to Win the Future
Through Expanded Wireless Access (Feb. 10, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/uiLaiQ.
(s See discussion, infra Part lIl.B.2.a-c.
1 See, e.g., Net Neutrality and Internet Regulation: Warranted or More Economic Harm
than Good?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Il2th Cong. (2011), http://commcns.org/tGHSoa; Using Spectrum
to Advance Public Safety, Promote Broadband, Create Jobs, and Reduce the Deficit:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech, of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, I12th Cong. (2011), http://commcns.org/sC4xke.
167 Memorandum from the Majority Committee Staff of the Subcomm. on Commc'ns and
Tech. to the Members and Staff, Hearing on "Using Spectrum to Advance Public Safety,
Promote Broadband, Create Jobs, and Reduce the Deficit" (Apr. 8, 2011).
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a. Senate Spectrum Reform Bills
Senators have introduced four bills during the 112th Congress focusing on
spectrum reform and authorizing the Commission to conduct voluntary
incentive auctions. In January 2011, Senator John Rockefeller (D-WV)
introduced the Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act ("S.
28"),168 followed by Senator Mark Warner's (D-VA) introduction of the
Spectrum Optimization Act in February.169 In March, Senators Olympia Snowe
(R-ME) and John Kerry (D-MA) introduced the Reforming Airwaves by
Developing Incentives and Opportunistic Sharing Act ("RADIOS Act").170
Lastly, Senator Rockefeller later teamed with Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
(R-TX) to co-sponsor another Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation
Act ("S. 911"). 1
S. 911 is the front-runner among the Senate bills and, as of this article's
publication, projects to be the top choice of all the incentive auction bills. On
June 8, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
voted 21-4 in favor of Senator Rockefeller and Hutchison's voluntary incentive
auction bill.172 The Act proscribes the FCC from directly or indirectly
reclaiming spectrum licensed to a television broadcast licensee,173 but allows
the Commission to use auction proceeds to compensate a licensee who
voluntarily relinquishes its spectrum. 174 S.911 also permits the FCC to re-pack
broadcast television spectrum, if doing so would meet several conditions
designed to provide non-participating licensees with the "same" channels to
168 Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act, S. 28, 112th Cong. (2011).169 Spectrum Optimization Act, S. 415, 112th Cong. (2011).170 Reforming Airwaves by Developing Incentives and Opportunistic Sharing Act, S. 455,
112th Cong. (2011).
1' Senators Rockefeller and Hutchison and Hutchison introduced S. 911 on May 9, 2011,
as the Strengthening Public-Safety and Enhancing Communications Through Reform,
Utilization, and Modernization (SPECTRUM) Act. The SPECTRUM Act was a placeholder
bill and set forth the Senators' belief that Congress should enact legislation to strengthen
public safety and to enhance wireless communications. After the Act's introduction, an
earlier draft bill circulated by Senator Hutchison's staff was incorporated into the
SPECTRUM Act to provide a detailed voluntary incentive auction plan. See Wireless
Innovation and Spectrum Enhancement Act (2011) (Discussion Draft). This resulted in the
introduction of S. 911 to the Senate Commerce Committee as the Public Safety Spectrum
and Wireless Innovation Act.
172 Press Release, Rockefeller Joined by West Virginia Public Safety Leaders for
Approval of New Network Legislation at Commerce Committee (June 8, 2011),
http://commons.org/vf6BW1; Press Release, Commerce Committee Approves Public Safety
Network Bill, Now Heads To Senate Floor (June 8, 2011), http://commcns.org/rBaenL. As
of this article's publication, no other spectrum reform bill has been subject to a vote at the
Senate Committee level.
173 Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act, S. 911, 112th Cong. § 303(a)(2)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(F)(ii)(1) (2011).
114 Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(F)(i).
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the extent that doing so is "technically feasible" and in the "public interest."175
To meet these "same" channel conditions, the re-packed channel must be
reasonably within the same spectrum band, in the same geographic market,
with the same population coverage, in which it has the same interference
protections. 176
The bill directs all auctions proceeds to be deposited into the Public Safety
Trust Fund. This Fund would be used to offset the cost of deploying a
nationwide public safety wireless network, compensate broadcast licensees
who voluntarily relinquish spectrum for auctions, and reimburse "reasonable
costs" for equipment, installation, and construction as a result of re-packing.178
The reimbursement fund would make up no more than 5% or up to $1 billion
of the total proceeds and would be available to non-participating incumbent
broadcast TV licensees, channel sharing participants and MVPDs.179
Establishing a nationwide public safety wireless network is also the main
focus of Senator Rockefeller's S. 28, which directs auction proceeds to fund
the deployment and operation of an interoperable, nationwide public safety
wireless broadband network. 80 However, S.28 is far less detailed than S. 911
in the manner it delegates incentive auction authority to the FCC.'8' Aside
from a prohibition on involuntary reclamation of spectrum, S. 28 permits the
FCC to decide the structure of voluntary incentive auctions.182
Senator Warner's Spectrum Optimization Act would allow the FCC to
implement a rulemaking that would offer incentives to licensees to entice them
to sell portions of their spectrum bands, which would then be auctioned. The
bill also would require the FCC to commence voluntary incentive auctions
within two years of its passage date.184 The Act's voluntary incentive auction
scheme calls for the Commission to establish a maximum revenue share
between the U.S. Treasury and an incumbent licensee, unless such a threshold
would decrease the amount of spectrum relinquished for auctions. However,
the Spectrum Optimization Act does not explicitly restrict the FCC from
involuntary reclamation of broadcast spectrum for incentive auctions and does
1s Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3090)(8)(F)(ii)(III)).
176 Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3090)(8)(F)(ii)(III)(aa)-(cc)).
'7 Id (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3090)(8)(F)(iii)).
7 Id (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3090)(8)(G)(v)), 401(b)(1)(A).
179 Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act, S. 911, 112th Cong. § 401(b)(2).
1so Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act, S. 28, 112th Cong. § 104(b)(5)
(2011).
' Id. § 204(b)(1)(B).
182 Id. § 204(d)(1) and (2).
83 Spectrum Optimization Act, S.415, 112th Cong. § 2(2) (2011).
84 id.
18 Id
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not extend the FCC's current auction authority.186
Taking a different approach, Senators Olympia Snowe and John Kerry's
RADIOS Act stresses that the FCC must ensure that there will be adequate
nationwide access to unlicensed spectrum when it carries out voluntary
incentive auctions.'8 In addition, unlike the other Senate bills, the RADIOS
Act extends the opportunity for incumbent licensees to participate and
specifically relinquish spectrum to only broadcast licensees.188
b. House Spectrum Reform Bills
There also have been four bills focused on spectrum reform introduced in
the House of Representatives during the 112th Congress, one of which is
considered to be the front-runner. Representative John Barrow (D-GA)
introduced the Spectrum Inventory and Auction Act of 2011 in March,18 9
followed by Representative Bob Latta's (R-OH) introduction of the Spectrum
Innovation Act in April.190 Additionally, Representatives John Dingell (D-MI)
and Gene Green (D-TX) introduced the Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless
Innovation Act in July.'91 Finally, the leading proposal in the House is
Representative Greg Walden's (R-OR) Jumpstarting Opportunity with
Broadband Spectrum Act ("JOBS Act"), which was circulated in November
2011.192
Representative Barrow's proposal would authorize the FCC to conduct
voluntary incentive auctions in a detailed and systematic approach similar to
NAB's two-fold request. 193 Specifically, the Spectrum Inventory and Auction
Act proposes amending Section 309(j) of the Communications Act to condition
the FCC's voluntary incentive auction authority upon the completion of a
spectrum inventory.194 In addition, the bill would require the FCC to establish
rules for voluntary incentive auction revenue sharing within 180 days of its
enactment. 195
Representative Latta's proposal stipulates that the FCC may incentivize
participation in incentive auctions by awarding a portion of the proceeds
186 See generally id
187 Reforming Airwaves by Developing Incentives and Opportunistic Sharing Act, S. 455,
112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
' Id. § 9(a).
189 Spectrum Inventory and Auction Act of 2011, H.R. 911, 112th Cong. (2011).
190 Spectrum Innovation Act, H.R. 1622, 112th Cong. (2011).
191 Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act, H.R. 2482, 112th Cong. (2011).192 Jumpstarting Opportunity with Broadband Spectrum Act (Discussion Draft), H.R.
S112th Cong. (2011), available at http://commcns.org/vjqGQQ193 See discussion, supra Part Ill.A.2.
194 Spectrum Inventory and Auction Act of20I 1, H.R. 911, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(5) (2011).
'9 Id. § 3(b).
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resulting from competitive bidding to incumbent licensees.196 Similar to many
of the other bills, the Spectrum Innovation Act strictly prohibits the
Commission from involuntarily reclaiming any frequencies from spectrum
holders who choose not to participate.197
The Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act is unique because
it would allow the FCC to conduct only one voluntary incentive auction of
broadcast television spectrum for mobile broadband use.198 In addition, the
proposal includes strict reimbursement and repacking provisions pertaining to
the FCC's authority to reassign frequencies for non-participating broadcast
stations affected by the voluntary incentive auction. 199 Unlike the spectrum
reform bills introduced by Representatives Barrow and Latta, Representatives
Dingell and Green focus primarily on the public safety communications
system.200
The JOBS Act was marked up by the House Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology and advanced out of the subcommittee by a
17-6 vote on December 1.201 Representative Walden followed the examples of
Senators Rockefeller and Hutchison and Representative Dingell, focusing
largely on resolving issues related to public safety in his spectrum reform
bill.202 The JOBS Act also discusses unlicensed spectrum use, as well as
federal and commercial spectrum allocation and relocation.203
Representative Walden separates incentive auction authority into three
sections, laying out general statutory mandates, requirements for incentivizing
broadcast licensees to participate voluntarily, and ground rules and limitations
for the FCC regarding its new voluntary incentive auction authority.204
Specifically, the JOBS Act prohibits the FCC from entering into an agreement
for a licensee to relinquish its spectrum unless the Commission first conducts a
reverse auction, in which at least two competing licensees participate, to
196 Spectrum Innovation Act, H.R. 1622, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
197 Id. § 4.
198 Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act, H.R. 2482, 112th Cong. §
303(a)(2) (2011).
19Id.
200 One reason that Representatives Dingell and Green introduced the Public Safety
Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act was to rebut the flexible provisions in Senators
Rockefeller and Hutchison's SPECTRUM Act. See Press Release, Dingell, Green Introduce
Public Safety Network Bill (July 11, 2011), http://commcns.org/ukxtut. While
Representatives Dingell and Green also disagreed with the public safety provisions in the
SPECTRUM Act, that subject is beyond the scope of this Note.
201 Press Release, Communications and Technology Subcommittee Approves JOBS Act
with Bipartisan Support (Dec. 1, 2011), http://commcns.org/tjiuQU.
202 See Jumpstarting Opportunity with Broadband Spectrum Act (Discussion Draft), H.R.
I12th Cong. §§ 201-241 (2011), http://commcns.org/vjqGQQ.
203 See id §§ 107, 301-303.
20 See id §§ 103-105.
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determine the amount of compensation licensees would accept for voluntarily
relinquishing their spectrum.205 These conditions also apply to broadcast
licensees, who may opt to relinquish all 6 MHz of their spectrum, move from
the VHF to the UHF band, or channel share.206 The JOBS Act also contains
two unique broadcast-specific rules. The first allows a non-participating
broadcast licensee to apply for a waiver of its service rules in the form of
regulatory relief instead of electing to receive relocation costs. 207 Additionally,
the bill requires that all reverse auctions, reorganizations, and reassignments of
spectrum occur contemporaneously. 208
c. Bjcameral Debt Reduction Bills
Though the House and Senate spectrum reform bills were not part of the
separate debt negotiations throughout the 112th Congress, the sponsors of
these bills expressed hope that voluntary incentive auctions could be part of the
larger effort to reduce the national public debt. Upon announcing the JOBS
Act, Representative Walden stated that he believed his bill could cut "up to
$15 billion in deficit reduction."209 Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office
predicted that voluntary incentive auctions alone would reduce direct public
spending by $24.5 billion in the next ten years when it analyzed Senators
Rockefeller and Hutchison's Act.210
After the CBO's report, members of Congress began to include voluntary
incentive auction provisions in bills focused on reducing the deficit. For
example, just one week after the CBO released its report, Senator David Dreier
(R-CA) introduced the Budget Control Act of 2011, authorizing the FCC to
conduct voluntary incentive auctions.211 Additionally, Senator Harry Reid (D-
NV) proposed a spectrum auction amendment to a bill intended to reduce the
federal budget deficit.212 The Reid amendment would have authorized the FCC
to conduct voluntary incentive auctions and permanently extended the
Commission's current auction authority as a spending cut in omnibus budget
205 See id. § 103.
206 See id. § 104(a)(1)-(2).
207 See id. § 104(b)(4)(B).
208 See id. § 104(f).
209 Press Release, Walden Unveils Jumpstarting Opportunity with Broadband Spectrum
Act (Dec. 1, 2011), http://commcns.org/rFDoYJ.
210 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE 1 (2011),
http://commcns.org/tnLixB.
1 See Budget Control Act of 2011, S. 2693, 112th Cong. §§ 221-227 (2011). On July 30,
Sen. Dreier's bill failed passage and was not agreed to in the House.
212 See Budget Control Act of 2011, S. 1323, 112th Cong. (2011); 157 CONG. REc. S4871
(daily ed. July 25, 2011) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
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control legislation.2 13 On the Senate floor, Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL) stressed
that Congress should authorize voluntary incentive auctions by highlighting the
potential for voluntary incentive auctions to increase broadband access to more
Americans, raise money for the U.S. Treasury, and increase productivity in all
sectors of the U.S. economy.214
The Senators' voluntary incentive auction proposals came during Congress'
debt ceiling debate. These negotiations resulted in the Budget Control Act of
2011, which increased the debt ceiling by $400 billion and established a Joint
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, colloquially known at the Super
Committee, to reduce the deficit by at least $1.5 trillion over a ten-year
215period. While Super Committee members expressed interest in adopting
Senators Rockefeller and Hutchinson's Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless
Innovation Act to help alleviate the nation's debt, 216 the committee ultimately
failed to meet its November 23 deadline. 217
There were also rumors of including Representative Walden's bill into
payroll tax extension legislation. Eventually, the JOBS Act was folded into the
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act and passed by the House by a
234-193 vote on December 13.218 While the Senate approved the Middle Class
Tax Relief and Job Creation Act by a vote of 89-10 on December 17, it
dropped the JOBS Act from the final version of the bill after Democrats argued
the provisions limited the FCC's ability to conduct incentive auctions.219 Given
the impending Congressional recess, it appears that that the status of voluntary
incentive auctions will remain unanswered until 2012 at the earliest.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF VOLUNTARY INCENTIVE AUCTIONS
As noted, the FCC's auction authority terminates on September 30, 2012.220
213 See 157 CONG. REC. S4870 (daily ed. July 25, 2011) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
214 See 157 CONG. REC. S4934 (daily ed. July 27, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mark Kirk).
215 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §§ 301, 401(b)(1)-(2), 125 Stat. 240,
251-52, 259 (2011).
216 See Brendan Sasso, Rockefeller, Hutchison Urge Supercommittee to Adopt Spectrum
Bill, THE HILL (Oct. 14, 2011), http://commcns.org/vKGo8a.217 See Press Release, Statement from Co-Chairs of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction (Nov. 21, 2011), http://commens.org/v5XreE; Brendan Sasso, Supercommittee
Fails, Closing Avenue for Spectrum Overhaul, THE HILL (Nov. 21, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tvBlUr.
See Katy Bachman, Spectrum Legislation Passes House: Part ofLarger Bill, Spectrum
Faces Uncertain Future in Senate, ADWEEK (Dec. 13, 2011). http://commcns.org/rQi0Kl.
See also Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act, H.R. 3630, 112th Cong. §§ 4001-
4402 (2011).
219 See Brendan Sasso, Spectrum Dropped from Payroll Tax Deal, THE HILL (Dec. 17,
2011), http://commcns.org/uswmbi.
220 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(11) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-4, § 5, 123 Stat. 112, 114
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This expiration date should compel Congress to extend the traditional
competitive bidding that the FCC has employed since 1993 and expand the
FCC's authority to include voluntary incentive auctions.221 President Obama
has stated that voluntary incentive auctions are "critical" for unleashing
spectrum to meet the nation's mobile broadband spectrum goals.222 The
President predicts that nearly ten billion dollars could be devoted to deficit
reduction over the next decade if licensees were provided with the opportunity
to relinquish a portion of their spectrum for mobile broadband auctions.223 The
remainder of this Note argues that Congress should authorize the FCC to
conduct voluntary incentive auctions. Members of Congress must recognize
that voluntary incentive auction authority would create a number of benefits,
including deferring the looming mobile spectrum crisis, reducing national debt,
protecting incumbent licensees, and advancing a market-based spectrum
policy.
Wireless networks soon will be unable handle the amount of bandwidth used
by consumers, moving mobile broadband industry leaders to stress the
importance of quickly freeing spectrum.224 The National Broadband Plan
explained that revising, revisiting, and reallocating spectrum takes an average
of six to thirteen years.225 Given this time frame, the mobile spectrum crisis
will have already arrived if the FCC chose to repurpose spectrum under its
current statutory authority.226 At that point and with very few options to meet
the public interest and demand for mobile services, the FCC may resort to
forcibly repurposing spectrum for mobile broadband, an action that would
likely be challenged and overturned in court.227 Rather than risking such a
possibility, Congress should authorize the FCC to conduct voluntary incentive
auctions with a mechanism to quickly act on the new authority.
If provided with the authority, the FCC has noted that its voluntary incentive
auction plans would be strictly voluntary and would reflect elements of the
proposed bills and issues introduced in the Broadcast Innovation NPRM.228
(2009).
221 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312, 387
(1993).222 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Details
Plan to Win the Future Through Expanded Wireless Access (Feb. 10, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/uiLaiQ.
223 d
224 Howard Buskirk & Yu-Ting Wang, Genachowski Renews Warnings of Spectrum
Crisis, CoMM. DAILY (Oct. 22, 2010).
225 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 79 exhibit 5-C.
226 Compare id, with COMMIssION SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 2, at 2; CIsCO MOBILE
DATA TRAFFIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 5; and OBI TECHNICAL PAPER No. 3, supra note 90,
at 4.227 See, e.g., FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 307-08 (2003).
228 See William Lake, Chief, Media Bureau, FCC, Remarks to the National Alliance of
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While the Commission has not foreclosed the possibility of outlining methods
for voluntary incentive auctions of other spectrum bands, such as MSS, to date
it has specified plans only for the broadcast bands.229 Specifically, the
Commission has mapped out three different ways in which a broadcast
television licensee could voluntarily participate in an incentive auction.230
First, an incumbent broadcast licensee could contribute its full 6 MHz channel
for an auction.231 Alternatively, two incumbent licensees could elect to share a
6 MHz channel via a private agreement, thereby relinquishing 6 MHz
together.232 Finally, an incumbent licensee could choose to contribute its UHF
spectrum and move its channel to the VHF band.233 Under all three methods,
the licensee would confidentially submit a reserve price with the FCC,
representing the minimum amount it would collect in its share of the proceeds
after an auction.234 If the FCC accepts the reserve price, the spectrum would be
eligible for competitive bidding, the proceeds of which would be shared by the
broadcast participant and the U.S. Treasury.235
Within this proposed scheme, the FCC has clarified that any broadcast
licensee choosing to volunteer for the second or third options would retain its
must carry rights and all other statutory and regulatory rights.236 Additionally,
the FCC maintains that any broadcast licensee choosing not to participate will
be in a strong position to provide the public with the benefit of free OTA
television.237 While the Commission has yet to determine the exact structure of
the auction or how the incumbent licensee and U.S. Treasury would share
proceeds, the agency has recognized two important technical considerations.238
First, LTE, to which most mobile wireless providers are transitioning, must be
deployed in clear spectrum with bandwidth as wide as 20 MHz of paired
spectrum.239 Second, the upper VHF band is the most attractive portion of the
State Broadcaster Associations: The FCC's Incentive Auction Proposal: New Options for
Broadcasters (Feb. 28, 2011) [hereinafter FCC Incentive Auction Proposal], available at
http://commcns.org/rrPhzU.
229 id
230 id.
231 Id.
232 id.
233 Id
234 See FCC Incentive Auction Proposal, supra note 228.
235 Id.
236 id.
237 id
238 id
239 Erica Ogg, More Carriers, Handset Makers Endorse LTE, CNET NEWS (Apr. 14,
2008), http://commcns.org/sB32CI; Marguerite Reardon, Alltell Joins LTE Bandwagon,
CNET NEWS (May 16, 2008), http://commcns.org/vwRzjZ; Long Term Evolution - LTE,
MOTOROLA, http://commcns.org/vEcROM (last visited Dec. 15, 2011); VERIZON WIRELESS,
LTE: THE FUTURE OF MOBILE BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY 10-11, available at
http://commcns.org/sd8K5U (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
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broadcast television band due to its propagation characteristics and proximity
to the 700 MHz band.240
As a result, the FCC has outlined three guidelines for spectrum realignment
that would open the upper-most portion of the 700 MHz band for competitive
bidding.241 First, the agency has offered to pay for any channel relocation costs
incurred by nonparticipants. 242 Additionally, the realignment would require
only a re-scan of the relocated channel, rather than any change in signal
contours or consumer equipment, making it simple for broadcasters.243 Finally,
no nonparticipating VHF broadcast licensee will be relocated to the UHF
band. 24
While the FCC already has a plan for implementing voluntary incentive
auctions that complements much of the proposed legislation, stakeholders may
make it difficult for the government to act in a timely fashion.245 For example,
NAB could argue that the FCC has not afforded enough protections for
broadcast licensees. The Commission's voluntary incentive auction ideas are
more likely to be challenged by broadcasters than mobile wireless companies
or MSS providers, given how each industry has responded to the goals outlined
in the National Broadband Plan.
Some pundits also predicted that AT&T and T-Mobile's proposed merger-
acquisition would hinder the passage of voluntary incentive auctions in the
112th Congress.246 While the companies withdrew their merger application and
signaled their intent to move on from the acquisition,247 proposed secondary
transactions to acquire large swaths of spectrum could be wrapped up in such
240 See FCC Incentive Auction Proposal, supra note 228. See also United States
Frequency Allocations: The Radio Spectrum, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM. NAT'L. TELECOM. INFO.
Assoc., http://commcns.org/sAi2Q0 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011); OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO.
3, supra note 90, at 1.
24 See FCC Incentive Auction Proposal, supra note 228.
242 id
243 id.244 id.
245 Cf In re Amendment of Part 27 of the Commission's Rules to Govern the Operation
of Wireless Communications Services in the 2.3 GHz Band; Establishment of Rules and
Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service in the 2310-2360 MHz Frequency
Band, AT&T Petition for Partial Reconsideration, WT Docket No. 07-293, IB Docket No.
95-91, GEN Docket No. 90-357, RM-8610, at 3-4 (Sept. 1, 2010) (providing an example of
a stakeholder's challenge to an FCC rule, when AT&T challenged the WCS proceeding
because its requirement to deploy a network within three and a half years was too fast to
meet the technical requirements). See also discussion, supra Part Ill.A.
246 See Sara Jerome, Analyst: AT&T Deal Could Delay Spectrum Bills, THE HILL (Mar.
23, 2011), http://commcns.org/rXAa38.
247 See Cecilia Kang, AT&T and T-Mobile Pull FCC Merger Application, Shift Focus to
Justice Dept. Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2011), http://commcns.org/u4gFOk; Cecilia
Kang, AT&T Gives Up on T-Mobile Merger, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://commcns.org/uaYOqG.
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an argument, as well. For example, the same pundits might argue that AT&T's
purchase of spectrum from Qualcomm and Verizon Wireless' pending
agreement to buy spectrum from cable companies would slow down the
passage of a voluntary incentive auction bills.248 However, mergers and
secondary market transactions that require Commission approval should be
independent from the question whether voluntary incentive auction authority
legislation will pass in a timely fashion. Instead, voluntary incentive auction
authority should be perceived as affecting more than only certain services such
as mobile broadband because tying the statutory authority to its most
immediate purpose focuses too narrowly on the public interest in commercial
spectrum. The opportunities through which FCC licensees could manage
spectrum and meet customers' interest in adopting innovative services would
be fulfilled more easily if the Commission were equipped with an effective
tool, such as voluntary incentive auctions in its proverbial spectrum use
toolbox.
If Congress grants the FCC incentive auction authority and demands a
voluntary and transparent process, it is doubtful that broadcast licensees would
thwart the implementation of a quick repurposing process. Given the revelation
of the Commission's plans, and the fact that the proposed legislation is
publicly available, broadcast licensees already are able to assess whether to
participate and how they can take advantage of the opportunity. As a result,
they will likely weigh the pros and cons of the following options: (1) continued
operation on its full 6MHz channel, with all possible channel relocation costs
insured by the auction proceeds; (2) a channel-sharing agreement with another
broadcast licensee, enabling it to maintain its licensee rights and receive capital
for continued operation; (3) moving from its VHF channel to the UHF band;
and (4) relinquishing of all of its spectrum, resulting in a capital infusion. Each
of these options would provide the licensee with more flexibility and a new
source of revenue.249
Upon introducing his bill, Representative Barrow stated that voluntary
incentive auctions are a concrete proposal to reduce the national debt. 250 The
recession years have been marked by a widely adopted nascent market-
248 See In re Application of AT&T Inc. and Qualcomm Incorporated for Consent to
Assign Licenses and Authorizations, Order, FCC 11-188, WT Docket No. 1 1-18 (Dec. 22,
2011), available at http://commcns.org/s4Xwv8; Cecilia Kang, Verizon Asks FCC to
Quickly Approve $3.6B Spectrum Buy from Cable, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tNArqm.
49 See OBI TECHNICAL PAPER No. 3, supra note 90, at 6; FCC Incentive Auction
Protosal, supra note 228.
o Press Release, Barrow Introduces Bill to Pay Down National Debt by Auctioning
Unused Broadcast Spectrum (Mar. 2011), http://commcns.org/vvHvro.
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namely, the iPhone era of mobile wireless technologies. 251 President Obama
has recognized Congress' unique opportunity to take advantage of this popular
wireless trend.252 Additionally, a voluntary incentive auction scheme would be
consistent with pledges to improve the U.S. economy, given that the money
collected by the U.S. Treasury would outweigh any spending required to
implement the proposed authority.253
Industry and government analyses agree that voluntary incentive auctions
would increase revenue for the U.S. Treasury.254 CTIA and the Consumer
Electronics Association ("CEA") examined past auctions for mobile broadband
uses and estimated that voluntary auctions for 120 MHz of broadcast TV
spectrum would result in bids totaling at least $30 billion.255 The report also
details the positive windfalls to the broadcast industry and the Federal
government.256 Similarly, both the FCC and White House budgets estimated
that voluntary incentive auctions would provide $28 billion and $27.8 billion
to the U.S. Treasury, respectively, within the next 10 years.257
The 112th Congress has the opportunity to bring money into the federal
coffers and create a flexible, market-based policy that would produce benefits
for both the holders selling and buying spectrum.258 The current FCC spectrum
statutory scheme does not challenge spectrum holders to use the spectrum at its
251 See discussion, supra Part II.B.
252 State of the Union Address, supra note 61.253 Compare FCC's Fiscal 2012 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Servs. and Gen. Gov't of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 13 (2011)
(statement of Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC) (explaining that Congress has routinely
capped the FCC at $85 million annually to conduct auctions), with Press Release, President
Obama Details Plan to Win the Future Through Expanded Wireless Access (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://commcns.org/uiLaiQ (expecting to gain $27.8 billion from voluntary incentive
auctions).
254 See, e.g., CTIA THE WIRELESS Ass'N & CONSUMER ELEC. Ass'N, BROADCAST
SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTIONS 2 (2011); Promoting Broadband, Jobs, and Economic
Growth Through Commercial Spectrum Auctions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commc'ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. I (2011)
(statement of Dean R. Brenner, Vice President of Gov't Affairs, QUALCOMM Inc.),
http://commcns.org/ttARtH; Promoting Broadband, Jobs, and Economic Growth Through
Commercial Spectrum Auctions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech. of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of the Hon. Greg
Walden, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commc'ns and Tech.), http://commcns.org/ttARtH.
255 CTIA THE WIRELESS Ass'N & CONSUMER ELEC. Ass'N, BROADCAST SPECTRUM
INCENTIVE AUCTIONS 9 (2011).
256 Id. at 1, 8-10.
257 FCC BUDGET FY 2012, supra note 30, at 17; OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
39-40 (2011).
258 Letter from Paul Milgrom et al., Economists, to President Barack Obama 1-2 (Apr. 6,
2011).
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highest value.259 Differences between the broadcast television and mobile
broadband industries demonstrate this fact; while the mobile wireless market
rapidly expands, the number of Americans who watch OTA broadcast
television content steadily declines.260 Even if broadcast licensees find a
successful method to offer their product on a mobile platform, 261 broadcast
television content lacks the consumer demand that existing mobile streaming
video applications enjoy.262 Moreover, if the Commission institutes a truly
voluntary incentive auction process, broadcast television licensees who want to
deliver innovative services such as mobile-DTV could maintain the ability to
simulcast an HD station, along with its innovative television service, by
keeping its full 6 MHz channel.263
Radio spectrum is most efficiently used with a flexible, market-based
approach rather than a government-managed command-and-control
approach.264 Although it would not be a classic contract or property model,
voluntary incentive auctions more closely adopt Congress' desired spectrum
value and efficiency impact than the FCC's current statutory authority.
Moreover, the FCC is less likely to be sued due to the voluntary nature of its
proposed incentive auctions.265 Although voluntary time and channel sharing
for broadcast radio spectrum failed in the 1920s, that situation is easily
distinguishable from voluntary incentive auctions with FCC oversight in
2011.266
259 DIGITAL CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at 238; Letter from Paul Milgrom et al.,
Economists, to President Barack Obama 1-2 (Apr. 6, 2011).260 See discussion, supra Part II.B; Stuart M. Benjamin, Roasting the Pig to Burn Down
the House: A Modest Proposal, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95, 98-99 (2009).261 See, e.g., In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel
Sharing and Improvements to VHF, Comments of The National Association ofBroadcasters
and The Association for Maximum Service Television, ET Docket No. 10-235, at i-ii, 13
(Mar. 18, 2011); In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel
Sharing and Improvements to VHF, Comments of The Open Mobile Video Coalition, ET
Docket No. 10-235, at I (Mar. 18, 2011).
262 Darrell Etherington, Direct Over-The-Air TV Coming to iPad and iPhone, GIGAOM
(Jan. 5, 2011), http://commcns.org/tBePMO.
263 In re Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and
improvements to VHF, Comments of National Association of Broadcasters and The
Association for Maximum Service Television, Inc., ET Docket No. 10-235, at 18 n.47 (Mar.
18, 2011).
264 See e.g., Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007).
265 See, e.g., Brooks V. Rice, The "Triumph" of the Commons: An Analysis of
Enforcement Problems and Solutions in the Western Climate Initiative, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 401, 409, 418, 425-26 (2010) (explaining that when regulations
concerning sulfur dioxide emissions transitioned from the Environmental Protection
Agency's standard command-and-control approach to a market-based, incentive rules, less
litigation resulted).
66 See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 18-21
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V. CONCLUSION
It is vital that Congress expand the FCC's current auction authority to
include voluntary incentive auctions. September 30, 2012 marks a unique
opportunity to reform the FCC's auction authority to reflect a flexible, market-
based spectrum policy that protects the interests of all parties and results in
financial windfall for the U.S. Treasury. The most effective version of this
legislation should prohibit involuntary reclamation of spectrum explicitly,
direct the FCC to implement its voluntary incentive auction plan quickly,
streamline the proceeds sharing among auction participants and U.S. Treasury,
and create non-monetary incentives that would protect the incumbents'
regulatory rights. The market-based mechanisms of voluntary incentive
auctions would provide the appropriate level of government oversight while
inducing FCC licensees to employ their spectrum at its highest and most
valuable use.
(2d ed. 2006) (explaining that President Hoover could only encourage voluntary agreements
between radio broadcast stations, and enjoyed no authority to propose rules to advance his
voluntary policies or deny applications for spectrum use. In contrast, if voluntary incentive
auction legislation were enacted, the FCC would oversee the voluntary incentive auctions to
preserve the public interest).
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